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Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn Zakariyya ibn Yahya al-Razi (865-925 or 932?)-I 
am listing all his names to distinguish him clearly from several other famous 
writers with the name al-Razi-the Latin Rhazes referred to in the prologue 
of the Canterbury Tales, was one of the greatest medieval physicians.' On the 
one hand, most of his medical works were translated into Latin, and his 
medical fame is universally acknowledged. His philosophical standing, on 
the other hand, is rather controversial.* His own apology, The Philosophic 
Life, which he wrote rather late in life, already indicates that some contem- 
poraries were disputing his right to call himself a philosopher.3 Like Galen, 
another philosopher-physician and one of his main sources, he was consid- 
ered by many an excellent physician but a poor philosopher. 
Many medieval Muslim intellectuals objected strongly to his views on 
religion and prophecy-so much so that they dubbed him "the heretic." 
Their religious concerns may have colored their evaluation of his philo- 
I cannot thank enough my colleague Richard M. Frank, who had the patience 
to comment on this text, not only checking the Arabic, but also taking care of my 
worst crimes against English. He made many useful and challenging suggestions. 
1. On al-Razi's life, see Paul E. Walker, "The Political Implications of al-Razi's 
Philosophy," in The Political Aspects of Islamic Philosophy. Essays in Honor of Muhsin 
Mahdi, ed. Charles E. Butterworth, Harvard Middle Eastern Monographs, 27 (Cam- 
bridge, Mass.: Center for Middle Eastern Studies of Harvard University, 1992), pp. 
61-65. On his life and works, see Abdurrahman Badawi, "Muhammad ibn Zakariya 
al-Razi," in A History of Muslim Philosophy, vol. I, ed M. M. Sharif (Wiesbaden: Otto 
Harrassowitz, 1963), pp. 43439; and Lenn E. Goodman, "Muhammad ibn Zakari- 
yya' al-RZzi," in History of Islamic Philosophy, part I, ed. Seyyed Hossein Nasr and 
Oliver Leaman, Routledge History of Wmld Philosophies, I (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1996), pp. 198-215. Paul Kraus edited most of al-Razi's philosophical 
works: al-Razi, Opera philosophica (Cairo: Imprimerie Paul Barbey, 1939). References 
are to this edition. 
2. See Walker, "Political Implication," pp. 65-74. 
3. Kraus edition, referred to in note 1, pp. 99-111. Previous editions of The 
Philosophic Life with an introduction and excellent French translation, also by Paul 
Kraus: "Raziana I. La Conduite du Philosophe. Trait6 d'6thique d'Abu Muhammad 
b. Zakariyya al-Razi," On'entalia N.S. 4 (1935): 300-34. English translation by Charles 
E. Butterworth, "The Book of the Philosophic Life,* Interpretation 20 (1993): 227-36. I 
refer to this translation and its numbered sections. 
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sophical achievements. As for the philosophers themselves, the falasifa,
they, too, expressed contempt for his philosophy. Al-Razi was very critical of
Aristotle and, therefore, a danger to their own orthodoxy.4 While Aristote-
lian philosophers were at great pains to harmonize Aristotle's and Plato's
views to strengthen their contention that philosophy had reached the truth,
al-Razi enjoyed refuting previous philosophers, be they Aristotle,5 Proclus,6
or even Galen,7 who influenced him so much. In fact, he delighted in
showing contradictions not only between religions (and even within Islam)
but also among philosophical schools. This earned him a general enmity.
Scholars, too, give rather mixed reviews of his abilities as a thinker.
Gaudefroy-Demombynes speaks of "gaps in his system" and describes The
Spiήtual Medicine as "rather pedestrian.8" Abdurrahman Badawi, however,
raves about him: "Al-Razi had no organized system of philosophy, but
compared to his time he must be reckoned as the most vigorous and liberal
thinker in Islam and perhaps in the whole history of human thought.9"
In fact an appraisal of al-Razi's philosophy is rather difficult since his
metaphysical works are lost and what we know about his views on these
matters comes from adverse reports. Yet there is no doubt that his philo-
sophical and religious views were important since several authors, such as
Abu Hatim al-Razi (a tenth-century Ismaili missionary), spent much time
refuting them at some length.1 0
4. Al-Razi's philosophical heroes are Socrates and Plato; in The Philosophic Lifehe
even calls Socrates his "Imam," the prayer leader (p. 99,1.5; Butterworth, n. 1, p. 227).
5. For instance, the first part of his Metaphysics is a virulent attack against
Aristotle's concept of nature. See Arabic text, pp. 116-24; Italian translation and
detailed commentary by Giulio A. Lucchetta, La natura e la sfera. La scienza antica e
le sue metafore nella cήtica di Razi (Bari: Milella, 1987). Lucchetta accepts the authen-
ticity of the attribution of this text to al-Razi (pace Badawi, "Muhammad ibn
Zakariya al-Razi," p. 439) and reviews previous discussion on this issue (p. 24).
6. Al-Razi wrote a refutation of Proclus, now lost.
7. Al-Razi penned Doubts against Galen, which has been recently edited by
Mehdi Mohaghegh, Kiiab Al-Shukak AίaJaΓinΰs (Tehran: Institute of Islamic Studies;
Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1993).
One can glean some sense of its content in the English introduction to this
edition—which was originally published in Islamic Studies Presented to Charles J.
Adams, ed. W. B. Hallaq and D. P. Little (Leiden: Brill, 1991), pp. 107-16)—and in
Shlomo Pines, "Razi critique de Galien," in The Collected Works of Shlomo Pines, vol. II:
Studies in Arabic Versions of Greek Texts and in Mediaeval Science (Jerusalem: Magnes
Press, 1986), pp. 256-63—which was originally published in Actes du VΠIe Congres
International dΉistoire des Sciences (Paris: 1953), pp. 480-87. On Galen's influence
on al-Razi's ethics, see Meir M. Bar-Asher, "A propos de Γinfluence de Galien sur
l'ethique d'Al-Razi," Studia IslamicalQ (1989): 130-47.
8. Έr-Razi philosophe d'apres des ouvrages recents," Revue de ΓHistoire des
Religions62 (1941): 169, 189.
9. See Badawi, "Muhammad ibn Zakariya al-Razi," p. 448.
10. Kraus published part of this controversy in Opera philosophica, pp. 291-316.
It comes from Abu Hatim al-Razi's AΊάm al-nubuwwah. 'Fabienne Brion has trans-
lated some of the relevant sections of Abu Hatim's book in "Philosophic et revela-
tion: Traduction anno tee de six extraits du Kitab AΊam al-nubuwwa d'Abύ
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Fortunately for our own purposes the edited texts, and in particular The
Spiήtual Medicine11 and The Philosophic Life, provide much information on
al-Razi's ethics, which is underpinned by a very unusual conception of the
soul. As Richard Sorabji has recently shown, late ancient philosophers were
debating animal psychology, as well as the treatment of animals. This led
some of them to reject the Aristotelian conception of the soul.12 Al-Razi is
much influenced by this debate and takes a position decidedly in opposition
to Aristotle. He therefore defends a conception of the rational (al-natiqa)
soul, which up to now has not been properly understood. It allows al-Razi
to set a hierarchy of sentient beings, while arguing for their kinship, since
he defends transmigration. This conception differs markedly from the
well-known views of famous Islamic philosophers, such as al-Farabi,
Avicenna, Avempace, and Averroes, and thus, is very interesting. Al-Razi
demonstrates originality and thoughtfulness.
Being "rational" for al-Razi is not simply a status. Rather it involves a
dynamism since each "rational" soul must somehow tend to imitate the
cosmic soul's return to its original better state. This is why the "rational"
soul is in need of spiritual medicine and why al-Razi wrote The Spiήtual
Medicine. I therefore first present al-Razi's conception of the individual
"rational" soul and then his understanding of the fall of the cosmic soul and
its rescue by God. To do so, I do not limit myself to his popular works, that
is, The Spiήtual Medicine and The Philosophic Life. Other works and sources of
information will allow me to reach a better grasp of al-Razi's philosophy and
to show that he is a consistent and original thinker.
I. THE INDIVIDUAL "RATIONAL" SOUL
Al-Razi holds that the rational soul (al-natiqa), "located" in the brain, sur-
vives death and that this soul, which is self-subsisting, may go through a
series of transmigrations before reaching its complete liberation from the
Hatim al-Razϊ," Bulletin de Philosophie medievale28 (1986): 134-62, and in "Le temps,
Γespace et la genese du monde selon Abu Bakr al-Razϊ. Presentation et traduction
des chapitres I, 3-4 du "Kitab a'lam al-nubuwwa" d'Abύ Hatim al-Razϊ," Revue
philosophique de Louvain 87 (1989): 139-64. Alessandro Bausani offers a more partial
translation in Un Filosofo "Laico " del Medioevo Musulmano. Abu Bakr Muhammad Ben
Zakaήyya Razi (Rome: Istituto di Studi Islamici, 1981), pp. 47-59.
11. Arabic text, pp. 15-96. Dimitri Gutas provided some corrections for this
edition in "Notes and Texts from Cairo Mss. I: Addenda to P. Kraus's Edition of Abu
Bakr al-Razi's Al-Tibb al-Ruhani" Arabica 24 (1977): 91-93. English translation by
Arthur J. Arberry, The Spiήtual Physick of Rhazes (London: John Murray, 1950). As
the Arabic edition and the English translation follow the same division into brief
chapters, I simply indicate the chapter and the page of the Arabic edition.
12. Animal Minds & Human Morals. The Oήgins of the Western Debate (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1993).
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body and its return to its own world, the world of the cosmic soul. An
Aristotelian conception of the soul, even if construed in a way that entails
the self-subsistence of the intellect and, therefore, its survival after death,
does not easily fit into a theory of transmigration. Al-Razi, who is no admirer
of Aristotle, either did not know much about Aristotle's conception of the
soul or simply put it aside to adopt one more satisfactory for his own
purpose. The basic scheme, including the location of the three souls,13 has
its source in Plato's Timaeus and the Galenic tradition,14 but al-Razi intro-
duces twists that we need to examine on their own terms. So first, we
consider his conception of the survival of the soul after death and its
self-subsistence. Second, we determine what exactly he means by "rational"
soul. Third, we see how his rather unusual understanding of "rational"
allows him to grant animals various degrees of incipient rationality. Finally,
we indicate how the hierarchy of sentient beings, and particularly their
usefulness to other sentient beings, determines the way in which they
should be treated.
A. The Survival of the Rational Soul after Death and Its
Self-subsistence
In the second chapter of The Spiήtual Medicine, al-Razi, who adopts Plato's
conception of the soul, attributes to Plato both these views—that is, the
survival and self-subsistence of the soul—and provisionally accepts them. All
human beings have three souls: (1) the vegetative, incremental, and sensu-
ally desiring soul, located in the liver; (2) the irascible or animal soul,
located in the heart; and (3) the rational (al-natiqa) or divine soul (al-'ila-
Kiya), located in the brain.15
At once al-Razi's Plato contrasts the rational soul with the two lower
souls. Only the rational soul subsists after death because it alone has its own
particular substance, whereas the other two souls are merely the sum of the
humors of the heart and liver. In fact the whole body, including the brain,
is simply the instrument and implement of the rational soul. In spelling out
the powers of the rational soul, al-Razi's Plato is careful to make this clear:
"Sensation, voluntary motion, imagination, cogitation, and memory arise
from the brain but not because this belongs to its material nature and
13. Al-Razi often speaks of three souls rather than of three faculties of the soul.
14. On al-Razi's Platonism, see Schlomo Pines, appendix ΓV, Novelles etudes sur
Ahwad al-Zaman Abu Ί-Barakat al-Baghdadi. Memoires de la Sociέte des Etudes Juives, I
(Paris: Societe des Etudes Juives, 1955), pp. 56-58. This text has been included in
The Collected Works of Shlomo Pines, vol. I: Studies in Abu Ί-Barakat al-Baghdadi. Physics
and Metaphysics (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1979). It seems to come mainly from the
Timaeus through Galen's Summary—Arabic edition with an introduction and Latin
translation by Paul Kraus and Richard Walzer, Plato Arabus, vol. I: Galeni Compendium
Timaei Platoni (London: Warburg Institute, 1951)—and Plutarch's Commentary.
15. Arabic text, pp. 27,11. 14-29, at 1. 1.
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humors, but rather because of the substance that resides in it and uses it as
an instrument and implement. Nevertheless, the brain is the nearest instru-
ment and implement of this agent."16 All activities, even sensation, that
involve some form of awareness are the realm of the self-subsisting rational
soul, which merely inhabits the brain. The cosmic soul, too, is self-subsis-
tent, as we shall see, and even existed purely in its own realm before it
foolishly desired to involve itself with matter. Later on, God in His compas-
sion rescued it by granting it intellect.17
Since in his Doubts against Galen al-Razi criticizes Galen for not accept-
ing the self-subsistence and immateriality of the soul, we do know that he
agrees with Plato on this issue. Al-Razi even says that observations that show
that cerebral wounds impede the normal functioning of the rational soul
are not real objections to its self-subsistence.18
Despite its self-subsistence the rational soul is entangled with the body
on this earth, but al-Razi's Plato is sure that if the rational soul would make
perfect and complete use of its rationality it would liberate itself from the
body in which it is enmeshed.1 9 The myth of the soul makes it clear that the
perfect use of rationality is to be equated with, and only with, philosophy.20
Al-Razi's Plato shares this view, though he couches it in more indirect terms
since he teaches that the rational soul should marvel and wonder about the
world (physics) and desire to know all about it and about the body. Of
special concern should be its own condition and its fate after death, that is,
psychology.21 As psychology is connected to the myth of the soul, which
involves God and His attributes, it will probably lead to metaphysics and so
to the whole of philosophy.
According to al-Razi, Plato thinks that such knowledge of the soul
combined with a desire to escape the body, will ensure that when the
sentient soul (al-hassasa notice the shift in terminology from rational to
16. Arabic text, p. 28,1. 11-p. 29,1. 1. The close connection between the brain
and the rational soul explains why what affects the cerebral humors can be an
obstacle to the intellect's activity.
17. On this see Lenn E. Goodman, "Razi's Myth of the Fall of the Soul: Its
Function in His Philosophy," in Essays in Islamic Philosophy and Science, ed. George F.
Hourani (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975), pp. 25-40; and Fritz
Meier, "Der "Urknall" eine Idee des Abu Bakr ar-Razϊ," Oήens 33 (1992): 1-21.
18. Arabic text, and Pines, "Razi critique de Galien," p. 484.
19. Arabic text, p. 28,11. 5-6.
20. See Spiήtual Medicine, chap. XX "On the Fear of Death," at the end of which
al-Razi explores the possibility that there may be some state to which the soul comes
after death. He then states that anyone "who has performed the duties of the true
shaήca should not fear death since this sharfa promised him victory, rest, and
attainment of eternal felicity. If anyone has some doubts about the sharfa or does
not know it or is not certain of its validity, he must search and examine to the utmost
of his effort and capacity" (pp. 95, 11. 16-96, at 1. 3). The true shaήca seems to be
philosophy since (1) al-Razi criticizes every revealed religion he knows of, and (2)
he states that there is neither revelation nor prophecy nor salvation, except through
philosophy.
21. Arabic text, p. 29,11. 14-17.
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simply sentient) leaves the body, it will join its own world and no longer have
any desire to mingle with anything bodily. The soul will then remain by
itself, alive, rational, immortal, immune from pain, and content with its
condition and place.22 Any rational soul that does not reach this level will
again hanker for a body and will get one. The Philosophic Life, which ex-
presses al-Razi's own views, also asserts that the acquisition of science and
the practice of justice (i.e., both theoretical and practical philosophy) will
deliver us from this world to another one that is free from pain and death.23
So the rational soul's self-subsistence grounds its survival after death
and the possibility of its final liberation from the body through the study
and practice of philosophy. Yet the careful reader may be puzzled. What
exactly does al-Razi mean by "rational soul"? If he equates it with the purely
human soul, how can he adopt transmigration? If not, why does he refer to
the irascible soul as the "animal" soul and state that it is mortal? Moreover,
sensation and voluntary motion were listed among the various activities of
the rational soul, and the rational soul is also called the sentient soul. It is
time to determine what al-Razi means by "rational soul" and "animal soul"
and whether he follows Plato's views in including sensation and voluntary
motion among the powers of the rational soul.
B. Al-Razi's Conception of the Rational Soul
In presenting Plato's three souls, al-Razi refers to the irascible soul as the
animal soul; he locates it in the heart, equates it with the sum of the heart's
humors, and therefore declares it to be corruptible since the humors are
corruptible. The animal soul's only role is to provide natural heat and pulse
motion, that is, unconscious and reflex motions that are linked to breathing
and the cardiovascular system. Voluntary motion and all other conscious
activities pertain to the rational soul.24
One of al-Razi's own medical works, The Introduction to the Art of Medi-
cine, confirms this understanding of the "animal soul" and the "rational
soul."25 Chapter X treats the organs. The heart is the origin of life and
22. Arabic text, p. 30,11. 10-15.
23. Arabic text, p. 101,11. 14-17; Butterworth, n. 9.
24. Arabic text, chap. II, p. 28, 1. 10-p. 29,1. 1. On al-Razi's conception of the
soul, see Lenn Evan Goodman, "Razi's Psychology," The Philosophical Forum 4 (Fall
1972): 26-48.
25. Libro de la introducciόn al arte de la medicina o "Isagoge" (Kitάb al-madkhal ilά
sinά 'at al-tibb wahwa Isάghύji deAbύ BakrMuhammad b. Zakaήyyά al-Razi, ed. with Span-
ish translation, introduction, and indices by Maria de la Concepciόn Vasquez de Be-
nito, Ada Salmanticensia, Filosofiay letras, 110 (Salamanca: Instituto Hispano-Arabe de
Cultura, 1979). Spanish references are to this edition. Arabic text in this case refers to
the Arabic text in this Vasquez edition and Spanish refers to the Spanish translation.
Notice the parallel between philosophy and medicine since the treatise is also called
an Isagoge, as is the first book in the traditional order of the organon.
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causes natural heat, breathing, and cardiovascular motions. Al-Razi adds
that bloodless and heartless animals have some other equivalent of the
heart. The brain is the origin of nerves and the spring of sensation, motion,
and the reasoning psychic actions referred to as ruling. The latter are
divided into: (1) imagination (al-wahm), that is, the imaginative power
located in the front of the brain, which receives what the five senses convey
to it; (2) the cogitative power (al-fikήya), located in the middle of the brain,
by means of which it knows the truth of things; and (3) the power of
memory (al-hifz), located at the back of the brain, which retains and
remembers.2 6
Chapter XI, dealing with the powers, offers more information. There
are three kinds of powers: (1) the psychic, residing in the brain; (2) the
animal, operating from the heart; and (3) the natural, acting from the liver.
The active animal power causes the heart's and arteries' contractions and
dilations. The passive animal power concerns itself with nerves that go out
of balance. Interestingly, in detailing how various emotions and passions are
symptoms of excessive humors connected to the heart, al-Razi spells out
what this unbalance means.2 7 This explains his concern that philosophy
includes study of the body and medicine. Bodily medicine helps to regulate
passion and the effect of humoral disorders in the brain, which is the
instrument so closely connected to the rational faculty. Such excess, for
instance, can give rise to melancholy, the tragic downfall of the overenthu-
siastic philosopher.28 There are three kinds of psychic powers: (1) the ruling
ones, which again are listed as imagination, cogitation, and memory; (2)
voluntary motion; and (3) sensation. The latter two use other organs in
addition to the brain, whereas any ruling activity operates by itself.29
From this it is clear that al-Razi fully endorses Plato's conception of the
animal and the rational souls. Even the technical terms used for the various
powers are the same.30 Yet the medical text adds an important point. The
powers of imagination, cogitation, and memory, located in the brain, form
a subgroup because they exercise the active role of regulation and ordering
and do not require instruments in addition to the brain. Therefore, sensa-
tion and voluntary motion are presumably subject to these powers. We and
some animals determine in which direction we will go and to what kind of
sensory objects we will pay attention.
It is now clear that by actions of the "animal" soul, al-Razi means the
unconscious, reflexive life activities shared by both animals and human
beings. The term "rational" covers all conscious activities, including sensa-
26. Arabic text, Vasquez, p. 65, and Vasquez Spanish translation, p. 77.
27. Arabic text, Vasquez pp. 73-74, n. 6; Spanish, p. 84.
28. Arabic text, Vasquez pp. 80-85, particularly n. 4; Spanish, pp. 91-95.
29. Arabic text, Vasquez, p. 72, n. 5 (read bi-nafsihi, instead of yanfasahu);
Spanish, pp. 83-84.
30. It is rather curious that neither Plato's scheme nor the medical text uses
the term "intellect." Is intellect identical with cogitation (al-fikr) or is it its highest
manifestation?
252 THERESE-ANNE DRUART
tion and voluntary motion, which again are common to animals and human
beings. So for al-Razi, the "rational" soul is far more encompassing than an
Aristotelian would assume and can integrate animals, which are all en-
dowed with sensation and, therefore, presumably can feel pain. This will
have enormous ethical implications. There is continuity between animals
and human beings since animals share at least some level of rationality as it
is broadly understood. This view allows for the possibility of transmigration
since even the souls of animals survive after death. What is not clear is
whether animals have incomplete rational souls and are missing some
powers or whether their bodily constitution does not allow them access to
all the powers of the "rational" soul they do have. If the latter, animals and
human beings have exactly the same soul but do not have the same access
to all its powers. In any case, there is no doubt that al-Razi's conception of
the rational soul is rather inclusive, and we need to examine the texts to
determine whether at least some animals enjoy some high level of the
ruling powers.
C. Animals and the Exercise of "Ruling Rational" Powers
In The Spiήtual Medicine, al-Razi often contrasts the behavior of animals with
the purposive, deliberate action of human beings, whose intellect, with the
help of imagination, can survey options and their long-term outcomes
before selecting the most advantageous. Clearly some animals, too, have
imagination and memory, but does any animal have some share of ration-
ality in the strict sense even if intellect as such seems denied to them?
The Spiήtual Medicine asserts that people who do not wonder about the
soul's fate after death—the most philosophically pregnant issue in that
text—have as much rationality as beasts (cattle) or, even worse, as bats,
vipers, and other worthless things, which do not cogitate or remember at
all.31 The implication is that some animals (such as bats) have no share in
cogitation and memory, whereas others (such as cattle) do, and that cogi-
tation is the highest power. It also assumes that human beings who do not
raise the central philosophical issue are not fully human. But as the context
is very rhetorical and the passage is intended to needle people into becom-
ing philosophers, readers could accuse me of taking too literally a piece of
rhetorical exaggeration. A passage in chapter XVII, however, supports my
contention that there is more here than a simple figure of speech. Though
this chapter on earning, acquiring, and so on gives rather short shrift to
animal social life—it does not benefit the individual because animals lack
complete mutual help and intellectual cooperation—it nevertheless ac-
knowledges that many "irrational animals" (understood by al-Razi as not
fully rational) acquire objects and store them away. Such animals, therefore,
31. Arabic text, chap. II, p. 29,11. 16-17.
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must enjoy a better ability to picture to themselves cogitatively than animals
that do not acquire, "for the cause of acquiring and what elicits it is the
picturing of a situation in which the object to be acquired is missing, though
the need for it remains."32 In other words such animals can picture to
themselves a complex future situation and adopt a course of action appro-
priate to its eventuality. Such an ability is also characteristic of the intellect.
In his so-called Metaphysics, al-Razi in fact asserts that some animals
have low levels or prelevels of higher powers. In that text he rejects Aris-
totle's conception of nature, particularly its teleology, as being too anthro-
pomorphic and as attributing to nature, which for al-Razi is purely passive
and inert, what in fact comes from God. In favor of nature's teleology, he
tells us, some cite the example of swallows, which build nests, and hornets,
which build houses—that is, precisely those animals that have a certain
social life, acquire, possess, and store. The defenders of nature's teleology
naturally attribute such purposive animal behavior to nature. Al-Razi coun-
terattacks by arguing that animals—in contradistinction to natural objects
such as fire, which have only one single constant action—do not act "by
nature" because "they have various actions such as flying when they need to
but remaining still after exertions when there is no need for flying, and
their choice (ikhtiyar) of feeding on some things and not on others and
their choosing high hidden places for their nests. Animals . . . have a cer-
tain choice and discernment even if they do not have full discernment and
do not yet reach the level of those that are endowed with intellect."33
This shows that although intellect proper is specific to human beings,
some animals are not far from that level since they enjoy some choice and
cogitation. So for al-Razi there is a hierarchy among animal species; some
are very close to the human level. This explains why, though "irrational" in
the strict sense, animals have some share in rationality, construed more
broadly as any form of consciousness and purposive behavior. These levels
of rationality allow for a kind of continuum between the various animal
species and human beings and, therefore, transmigration. The animals'
share of rationality and the immortality of their "rational" soul entitle them
to proper treatment but also to eventual deserved punishment since they
are endowed with choice.
D. The Treatment of Animals and Human Beings
and Transmigration
Though The Spiήtual Medicine stresses the gap between animals and human
beings, it shows at the very beginning an interest in treating them well. In
32. Arabic text, p. 83,11. 6-7.
33. Arabic text, p. 121, 1. 20-p. 122, 1. 6; Italian translation in Lucchetta's La
Natura e la Sfera, p. 365.
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the praise of intellect in chapter I, the intellect's first advantage is that it
leads to a preference of us over the "irrational" animals so that we rule over
them and dispose of them in ways that yield benefits to both us and to
them. 3 4 In chapter II, while summarizing the views of philosophers who
assert the soul's self-subsistence and survival after death, al-Razi indicates
that such philosophers think that those who have inflicted pain on animals
to satisfy their own pleasures "will come to see that they suffer woeful
consequences after the soul leaves the body; its pain, regret, and distress
shall be many and long enduring."3 5 However, since The Spiήtual Medicine
focuses on character reformation and barely touches on social ethics, not
much else is said on this issue.
The treatment of human beings is addressed in passing in various
chapters, for example, the chapter on envy. Envy is closely related to malice.
The malicious resent the good luck of those who never offended or injured
them and take pleasure in their injuries. They deserve the hatred of God,
because God desires the good of all men, and of men, because they are
hateful and unjust to them. 3 6 Chapter IX, on lying, allows lying if this
confers an advantage to the person lied to, particularly if it saves his life.
The chapter on earning speaks only of cooperation through one's work.37
Obviously all human beings should be treated well and justly. Justice, how-
ever, may require punishment for wrongdoing, and the chapter on anger
discusses how to mete out punishment in proportion to the crime.3 8 None
of these passing remarks leads to detailed justifications or an elaboration of
the principles from which they may derive.
Chapter XIX, which sums up the virtuous life, describes it as the one
followed by all great philosophers. It consists in treating all human beings
justly and, beyond that, in showing compassion and benevolence to all and
trying to secure the advantage of all human beings, except evildoers.39 This
call to universal justice and benevolence has a nice ring to it but sounds a bit
superficial since no justification is given for this prescription and terms as
complex as "justice" are not defined. Furthermore, the incentive to follow
such a way of life is sheer self-interest: justice will ensure our own safety from
our neighbors and compassion will ensure their love for us.4 0 The only
interesting point is that many people are constrained by evil shaήcas, or laws
to perform evil actions. Examples of such bad laws refer to people who allow
deceitful treatment of opponents; the Manicheans' refusal to give water,
food, and medical treatment to those who do not share their views; those who
abstain from killing dangerous, useless animals such as scorpions; and those
who do not wash. Such people do not practice universal justice and benevo-
34. Arabic text, p. 18,11. 1-2.
35. Arabic text, p. 24,11. 8-11.
36. Arabic text, chap. VII, p. 48.
37. Arabic text, chap. XVII, pp. 80-82.
38. Arabic text, chap. VIII, p. 56.
39. Arabic text, p. 91, 11. 7-11.
40. Arabic text, p. 92,11. 7-9.
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lence nor work at diminishing potential evils for themselves or others. The
last chapter on the fear of death asserts that if there is an afterlife, those who
have performed all the duties of the "true sharta" that is, philosophy, should
not fear death since everlasting happiness is promised to them. Obviously
al-Razi has definite views on the way in which one should treat others and
oneself but does not justify them, and his incentive to the reader for adopting
them is simply that they lead to a better afterlife.
The Philosophic Life, which determines not only how we should treat
ourselves but also how we should treat other living beings and maintain the
world, exhibits much interest in the treatment of animals. It spends much
more time on this question than on the treatment of other human beings.
As the text is al-Razi's own apology, we should not be surprised that he
would deal at greater length with more controversial issues. Treating one's
fellow human beings well is common to most religions, among them Islam,
and to most philosophers. Belief in transmigration is less common; more-
over, al-Razi does not even share with some of its adept the view that all
sentient life should be equally respected. Also, whether one can eat meat or
sacrifice animals had been disputed among such philosophers as Plutarch
and Porphyry.41 Even philosophers who upheld transmigration were di-
vided between those who took it as a one-way street—that is, accepting
transmigration from animals to human beings but not vice versa—and
those who saw it as a two-way street.42 It comes as no surprise that al-Razi
states no fewer than three times that his champion, Socrates, even though
he recanted his previous asceticism, never ate meat.4 3
The imitation of God's mercy requires us, and apparently animals as
well, "not to cause any pain to a sentient being if this being has not deserved
to be pained or if the pain inflicted will not prevent a greater pain."4 4 As for
God's justice, it requires the punishment of those who deserve it.45 The first
criterion for the treatment of animals is how they act toward human beings
and other animals. Since al-Razi attributes some level of choice to at least
some animals, we are not surprised that such animals can be rightly said to
deserve punishment if they treat other sentient beings badly. The second
criterion is the hierarchy of living beings since, as we have seen, human
beings rule animals. Moreover, the final liberation of the rational soul from
the body can come only from a human body, not an animal body,46 where-
fore an animal's death can be a step toward the final liberation of its soul.
41. See Kraus, "La conduite du philosophe," p. 308, and Sorabji, Animal Minds
& Human Morals.
42. See Kraus, "La Conduite du Philosophe," p. 328, n. 1.
43. Arabic text, p. 99,1. 7, 1. 18, and p. 105,1. 14.
44. Arabic text, p. 103,11. 17-18.
45. See The Spiritual Medicine, chap. VIII, on anger, p. 56,11. 4-9; and principles
1 and 4 in The Philosophic Life, which speak of the rewards and punishments granted
by God in the afterlife, p. 101, 11. 13-14 and p. 101, 1. 19-p. 102, 1. 1; Butterworth,
n. 9.
46. Arabic text, p. 105,11. 1-4, 12-13; Butterworth, nn. 18, 20.
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The concrete examples al-Razi gives help us to understand how he
applies these criteria. Imitation of God's mercy is first in the order of
presentation. Since one should not cause useless pain to an innocent
sentient being, kings should not take pleasure in hunting and people
should not impose excessive labor on domestic animals. Yet, as animals are
inferior to human beings, animals can be domesticated, and in cases of
necessity, whenever justice and intellect require, one can cause serious
hardship and even death to an animal if it can save a human life, as when
a rider is pursued by an enemy. Al-Razi comments that this is true especially
when the particular human being is learned and good or if his safety would
be of greater use for humankind since "the usefulness of this man and his
remaining in this life would be more fitting for people than preservation of
this horse."47 Curiously, the only reference specific to the treatment of
human beings is presented as a follow-up. If two men are in the desert and
one of them has only enough water for the survival of one person, the water
should be given to the one who is most useful to humankind.48 The ques-
tion of who owns the water is apparently irrelevant.
Imitation of God's justice follows. On the one hand, carnivorous ani-
mals such as wolves, lions, and tigers must be exterminated as far as is
possible because they would themselves exterminate many other animals
and because their death may hasten their final liberation—there is hope
they will move to more salutary bodies.49 As for vipers, scorpions, hornets,
and the like, which are less destructive than carnivores but may cause pain
to other animals and cannot be domesticated, they may be, but need not
be, exterminated.50
On the other hand, domestic animals—does this include useful carni-
vores, such as cats and dogs?—and herbivores should not be destroyed but
rather should be treated with gentleness and used as little as possible for
47. Arabic text, p. 104, 11. 1-11, particularly, 11. 9-11; Butterworth, nn. 15-16.
As al-Razi stresses the criterion of usefulness to other people over the possible
intrinsic value of human life, it is not altogether clear whether a poor specimen of
a human being, such as a cruel, old criminal, should take priority over a young,
gentle, and useful horse—particularly since the classic case of whose life should be
saved is presented as an afterthought or a development of this case of choice
between an animal and a human life.
48. Arabic text, p. 104,11. 11-13; Butterworth, n. 16.
49. Arabic text, p. 105, 11. 4-6; Butterworth, n. 18. This statement makes one
wonder whether al-Razi thinks that the specific bodily makeup of various animal
species determines their mental and moral level and the specificity of their soul or
if all animals, including human beings, have the same soul but various species of
bodies determine the number and level of powers they can use. In other words, do
human beings and animals have exactly the same soul but only human bodies allow
full use of them?
50. Arabic text, p. 105, 11. 7-9; Butterworth, n. 18. In the Metaphysics, al-Razi
endowed hornets with some choice. In The Spiήtual Medicine, chap. XIX, p. 91, 1.
13-p. 92, 1. 1, al-Razi criticizes Manicheans who abstain from killing snakes and
scorpions.
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food. Moreover, to prevent such a result, they should not be bred in such
great numbers that their slaughter would be necessary.51 Al-Razi adds that
if it were not that final liberation from the body occurs only from human
bodies, then slaughter of lower animals would never be allowed.52
E. Implications of Transmigration and the Progressive Return
to the Realm of Soul
The insistence that a soul's final liberation can take place only from a human
body has an ethical implication we have already seen. The killing of useful
animals may be allowed in case of necessity because it gives them a chance to
move to a better body, that is, a human one. From this it would follow that the
killing of innocent human beings is never allowed since their souls cannot
move to a better kind of body. Al-Razi states that serious injustice—and kill-
ing an innocent human being is such an injustice—prevents the perpetra-
tor's soul from reaching lasting happiness, at least after this particular life. As
he puts it, even acquiring domination over the whole earth for the span of
one's life at the price of committing crimes against human beings would not
be worthwhile since it would deprive that individual of lasting bliss.53
If the souls of animals can move to better bodies, there is a need, at
least until some time in the future, for a fresh supply of human bodies.
Though The Spiήtual Medicine certainly does not encourage procreation
(since one of the ways to prevent mourning is not to procreate5 4) and
declares copulation evil in itself,55 The Philosophic Life, in contrast, encour-
ages procreation at least moderately. Highlighting that Socrates came to
procreate in the better phase of his life, al-Razi states, at least a couple of
times, that true philosophy encourages the propagation of the human
species56 and rejects solitary life.
Because of his conception of the "rational" soul as involving a broad
and a narrow meaning of rationality, al-Razi is able to reduce the distance
between human beings and animals. He has, therefore, psychological un-
derpinnings for both transmigration and his moral views concerning the
treatment of animals. He is also fully aware that his new conception of the
soul must lead to the abandonment of Aristotle's teleological conception of
nature. In fact, al-Razi also rejects Aristotle's cosmology and metaphysics, as
we see now in the discussion of the cosmic soul.
51. Arabic text, p. 105,11. 9-11; Butterworth, n. 20.
52. Arabic text, p. 105,11. 12-13; Butterworth, n. 20.
53. Arabic text, p. 103,11. 3-6; Butterworth, n. 13. See also p. 106,1. 18-p. 107,
1. 2; Butterworth, n. 25.
54. Both in the English translated by Asberry and in the Arabic edition by
Kraus, chap. XII, on grief.
55. Ch. XV.
56. Arabic text, p. 99, 11.7, 10-12; Butterworth nn. 1-2; Arabic text, p. 100, 11.
19-20 and p. 101,11. 1-2; Butterworth, nn. 7-8.
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II. THE COSMIC SOUL
Al-Razi's insistence on the necessity of spiritual medicine or character
reformation implies that each "rational" soul needs some kind of restora-
tion and return to an original, better state. This view becomes clear when
we look at his famous myth of the soul. Before analyzing this myth we
should recall that al-Razi's cosmology and metaphysics are rather un-Aristo-
telian and known only indirectly through quotations and adverse reports,
particularly those of Abu Hatim al-Razi.57
Al-Razi holds that there are five eternal principles: (1) the creator, or
perhaps more exactly, the demiurge, though he is usually referred to as
al-baή\ a Koranic term; (2) soul; (3) matter, or hyle; (4) space; and (5) time.
Al-Razi is fully aware that this conception is rather uncommon among
Greek philosophers in general and far from Aristotle's in particular. Of
course, soul, which is one of the five eternals, as they are called, is a cosmic
soul and, like the other eternals, seems to be uncreated. The relation
between this cosmic soul and the particular souls of animals and human
beings is none too clear, but the life story of each individual soul appears to
be an exemplification of the adventure of the cosmic soul.58
The five eternals constitute the background for the myth of the soul as
told by Abu Bakr al-Razi, according to Abu Hatim's account in the Signs of
Prophecy:59
I say that the five [principles] are eternal whereas the world came to
be. The reason for the world's coming into being is the following: soul
desired to get enmeshed into this world60 and sensual desire [al-shah-
wa\ moved it to do so without soul knowing what evil consequences
would affect it [soul] once it would get enmeshed into the world and
57. For Abu Hatim's text, see Kraus's Arabic text, pp. 295-313. For al-Razi's
metaphysics and cosmology, see Salomon Pines, Beitrάge zur islamischen Atomenlehre
(Berlin, 1936), pp. 34-93. Badawi, "Muhammad ibn Zakariya al-Razi," pp. 440-46;
Majid Fakhry, "A Tenth Century Arabic Interpretation of Plato's Cosmology, "Jour-
nal of the History of Philosophy 6 (1968): 15-22; and Fritz Meier, "Der 'UrknalΓ eine
Idee des Abu Bakr ar-Razϊ," Oήens 33 (1992): 1-21.
58. Fakhry already mentioned this parallel in "Tenth Century Arabic Interpre-
tation," p. 18.
59. It seems that al-Razi considers this myth to be an argument against the materi-
alists who defend the eternity of the world. Goodman attempts to explain this claim in
"Razi's Myth of the Fall of the Soul." Fritz Meier does the same in "Urknall." Abu Ha-
tim, who reports this claim, thinks the myth is such a poor argument that he accuses
al-Razi of having let "his passion overcome" his intellect (Arabic text, p. 308,1. 19).
This must be a particularly galling comment for the author of The Spiήtual Medicine.
60. The exact meaning of the verb tajabbala (Arabic text, p. 308,11. 9-10) is rather
obscure. Brion in "Le temps, Γespace," translates as 'Tame a desire informer ce
monde" (p. 156). Alessandro Bausani, inFilosofo "Laico, "adopts "L'animabramo im-
pastarsi col mono" (p. 55). Meier in "'Urknall,'" wavers and finally selects "Die Seele
(Urseele) hatte Lust in diese Welt einzugehen" (pp. 16-17, n. 45).
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into turmoil over the world's coming to be. Soul then moved matter
with tumultuous, wayward and disorganized motions being unable to
achieve that which it willed. The creator had mercy on soul and helped
it to bring this world into being. He brought soul to organization and
balance because he had mercy on it and knew that once soul had tasted
the evil consequences of what it had done, it would return to its own
world. There its turmoil would quiet down and its sensual desire cease
and vanish. Thus this world came into being through the help the
creator gave to soul. If it were not for this help soul would not have
been able to bring the world into being and if it were not for this reason
this world would not have come into being.61
Some elements in this story are very important:
1. Soul did not know the consequences of its intended action.
2. Because of this ignorance, soul was misled by sensual desire (shahwa, a
species of passion, hawan).
3. Soul's action was disorganized and unsuccessful and soul did not ac-
complish what it willed >arada; this by implication seems to be the origin
of evil and pain.
4. God was merciful and knew that His intervention would have a benefi-
cial outcome.
5. Because of His mercy and knowledge, God came to the rescue of soul
and so got both soul and the world organized.
6. Once it has realized what it has done, soul will return to its own world
free from turmoil and sensual desire.
One point in this version is never explained, however. What exactly is the
kind of help the creator brought to soul? I would like to suggest that this
help is none other than the gift of intellect, which brings about philosophy.
If we accept this interpretation, which has its source in Nasir-i-Khusraw's
version of the myth, we discover that the important elements of the tale are
also present in The Spiήtual Medicine, which is designed to help individual
rational souls to return to their previous better state.62
What really misled the cosmic soul into following sensual desire—and
after all The Spiήtual Medicine is an attempt to reform this sad behavior—is
not knowing the consequences of its intended course of action. By contrast,
what leads to God's successful rescue operation was His knowledge of the
outcome of His intervention. The very first chapter of The Spiήtual Medicine
sums up all the advantages that arise from intellect in the following way:
61. Arabic text, p. 308, 11. 8-15. French translation and context in Brion's "Le
temps, Γespace," pp. 139-64, particularly p. 156.
62. This version can be found in the original Persian, as well as in Arabic
translation, in Kraus's Arabic text, pp. 284-86; German translation in Meier, pp.
10-11. All the elements found in Abu Hatim's version are also present in Nasir-i-
Khusraw's.
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"Without intellect our state would be the state of beasts, children, and
lunatics"; with it "we picture to ourselves our intelligible actions before they
become manifest to the senses and so we see them as if we had sensed them.
We then copy their forms in our sensible actions and they become manifest,
conforming to what we imitated and imagined of them."63
In other words, intellect allows us to use mental representations of
future actions to test their outcome so that we are able to realize what we
have imagined as we have imagined it. It is true that the passage I have just
translated does not even allude to a survey of consequences for possible
courses of action or to a subsequent selection of the most advantageous.
Nevertheless, many other passages that contrast human beings with ani-
mals, children, or lunatics show clearly that what is at the core of intellect's
usefulness is its ability to evaluate alternatives through their long-term
consequences and to select the most profitable.
Chapter II, for instance, considers people superior to animals because
people have the faculty of will and the capacity to postpone action so that
it follows deliberation. Because animals do not deliberate, they cannot
restrain their natural inclination for the sake of intellectual values, and so
they do not have choice.64 A page later, al-Razi develops the contrast be-
tween natural inclination and intellect. "Passion and natural inclination
always call us to follow immediate pleasures and to prefer them without
cogitating and deliberating about their outcome." They even hurry us to
what will yield pain since they, like a child, see no further than the present
instant. In contrast, anyone who follows his intellect will carefully consider
the outcome, picture it to himself, and weigh the options. They only will be
able to choose the most advantageous.65 In the same way, chapter VIII, on
anger, asserts that there is little difference between a lunatic and anyone
whose anger has left him bereft of the ability to cogitate and deliberate.66
Chapter XVIII links the human capacity to use imagination for reviewing
options and their outcomes to the possibility of avoiding what is harmful
and heading straight for what is useful.67 The many other references to the
same point highlight its importance.68 Notice that in this popular work
63. Arabic text, p. 18,11. 9-12.
64. Arabic text, p. 20, 11. 10-15, even if, as we saw earlier, in other texts al-Razi
attributes choice to some animals
65. Arabic text, p. 21,1. 13-p. 22, 1. 6. Some readers will be reassured to know
that al-Razi thinks that education accustoms children to rein in their natural
impulse. See, chap. II, p. 21.
66. Arabic text, p. 55,11. 14-15.
67. On the quest for ranks, Arabic text, p. 85,1. 16-p. 86,1. 2.
68. For instance, Arabic text, chap. II: animals are so engrossed in the immedi-
ate pleasure that they keep eating peacefully up to their being slaughtered (p. 24,
1. 16-p. 25, 1. 1). Chapter VIII: animals unleash action without deliberating (p. 56,
1. 4). Chapter XIV: drunks, too, stop thinking and deliberating and so rush into
action, thereby giving up their rationality and joining sheer animality (p. 73,1. 10).
Chapter XV: sex addicts emulate billy goats and bulls, which lack deliberation and
thought of consequences (p. 76, 11. 16-17). Yet in chap. XVII, on earning, al-Razi
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al-Razi highlights differences between animals and human beings to con-
vince the latter to make full use of their rationality and of the gift of
intellect, whereas, as we saw earlier, in more technical works he does not
hesitate to express his conception of the "rational" soul—which encom-
passes both animals and human beings.
The ability to chart and to evaluate mentally various courses of action
and their outcomes in order to select and realize the most useful is what
distinguishes adult human beings from lunatics, children, and animals. It
saves us from being misled by passion since it makes us understand that
following passion or sensual desire is to our own disadvantage. Because of
this same capacity, God rescued the cosmic soul from the bad consequences
of its desire.
On the one hand, the adoption of a poor course of action does not
allow soul to realize that which it willed. On the other hand, if we are led
by intellect, which selects and carefully plans the most useful course of
action, we reach the object of our will.69 Then our action is organized and
successful since it allows us to rule animals in ways that are profitable not
only to us but also to them and to reach our goals by means of navigation,
medicine, and various techniques granted by intellect.'70 The fact that al-
Razi insists that these crafts arise from intellect highlights his distance from
many Muslims, who claim that human beings learned them through reve-
lation. Such skills will ensure the instauration of the world, and the duty to
maintain the world is a theme that The Philosophic Life uses to tone down
Socrates's early asceticism. It also allows al-Razi to defend the necessity to
exercise a profession even if one is a philosopher. As for the poor "mindless"
cosmic soul, left to itself it did not succeed in organizing the world and was
simply jerking it in every direction without accomplishing anything.71 Fi-
nally, intellect leads to our own ultimate well-being parallel to soul's return,
freed from desire, to its own realm.72
It is rather striking that with one exception all the important elements
in the myth of the cosmic soul find a parallel in the first chapter of The
Spiήtual Medicine, which retraces the way individual souls can escape from
the snare of passion and sensual desire. This liberation is a slow process that
concedes that animals who store provisions have a greater share of cogitative
imagination (p. 83,11. 5-6).
69. Arabic text, p. 18, 11. 3-4.
70. The Spiήtual Medicine, p. 18, 11. 1-6; The Philosophic Life, p. 102, 11. 3-4;
Butterworth, n. 9.
71. Since only God could organize this world, one can understand that al-Razi
objected strenuously to attributing to nature itself the organization God granted to
it. See his criticisms of Aristotle's notion of nature in Metaphysics, Kraus's Arabic text,
pp. 116-24.
72. The Spiήtual Medicine, chap. I, p. 19,11. 1-2. In chap. II, al-Razi's Plato claims
that "if [the rational soul] would use its rationality fully, this would be its liberation
from the body with which it is entangled" (p. 28,11. 5-7) and, therefore, presumably
its return to its own realm in which there is no pain (p. 30,11. 14-15).
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requires an increase in knowledge, particularly in philosophy. It is, there-
fore, no surprise that al-Razi thinks that, with time, knowledge progresses
in accuracy and scope, and he is thus ready to criticize openly his predeces-
sors in medicine and philosophy. This contrasts with the views of Aristote-
lian philosophers, such as al-Farabi and Averroes, who claim that
philosophy reached its peak with Aristotle. Rather, al-Razi made himself the
champion of personal examination and critical thinking {ijtiKad) in con-
trast to those who advocated the uncritical following of tradition (taqlίd), be
it in medical, religious, or philosophical matters.7 3
The one element in the myth of the soul that, while prominent in The
Philosophic Life, is downplayed in The Spiritual Medicine is the role of God,
particularly His motivation in rescuing soul and organizing the world. God's
motivation for His rescue was His mercy, that is, an altruistic motivation. So
al-Razi's normative ethics, which calls for the human being to imitate God
as far as possible, requires helping other living beings to reach their goal
and the preservation of the world.74 For al-Razi, imitating God means
reenacting God's compassionate treatment of the cosmic soul and His help
in realizing its project of the constitution of the world.
Human beings, therefore, do not simply need to take care of their own
souls for their greater advantage, as The Spiήtual Medicine, an introductory
work for eventual would-be philosophers, preaches. After all, that text
recommends even proper social behavior not on the grounds of altruistic
motivations but on mere self-interest: being just ensures our safety from our
neighbors and showing mercy ensures their love for us.7 5 Rather, human
beings ought also to imitate God's compassion and mercy in helping other
living beings for their own sake and to maintain the world. The Spiήtual
Medicine, which lays great emphasis on the intellect, highlights the contrast
between animals and human beings. As reading this text precedes the study
of philosophy, which will include the examination of the soul and the
determination of God's attributes, it limits itself to self-interest and ends on
an appeal to begin research into the soul's fate. In contrast, The Philosophic
Life, which assumes acceptance of the myth of the soul and knowledge of
God's main attributes, spells out our duties to all sentient beings, and
animals in particular, since it posits transmigration. Therefore, to under-
73. See, for instance, his introduction to his Doubts against Galen, Arabic text,
pp. 1-18; and Pines, "Razi critique de Galien," pp. 480-83, particularly his dispute
with Abu Hatim al-Razi, p. 300, 1. 21-p. 303, 1. 18, in which al-Razi contrasts the
personal reflection proper to philosophers with the uncritical acceptance (taqUd)
of other people. On this issue of taqtid and its complexity, see Richard M. Frank,
"Al-Ghazali on Taqlϊd, Scholars, Theologians, and Philosophers," Zeitschήft fur
Geschichte der arabisch-islamischen Wissenschaften 7 (1991-92): 207-52.
74. On al-Razi's ethics, see Therese-Anne Druart, "Al-Razi (Rhazes) and Nor-
mative Ethics," in Tradition and Renewal, vol. 2, ed. David A. Boileau and John A.
Dick, Louvain Philosophical Studies, 6 (Louvain: Leuven University Press, 1993), pp.
167-81.
75. Arabic text, chap. XIX, on the virtuous life, p. 92,11. 7-9.
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stand al-Razi's social ethics—broadly construed as covering his treatment of
both animals and human beings—we need to have grasped how much his
own conception of the individual "rational" soul differs from the predomi-
nant Aristotelian one and how it relates to his understanding of the cosmic
soul's history of the fall and return to its own realm because of God's gift
of intellect. Once this is done, one can agree with al-Razi that he is truly a
philosopher.

